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In recent months, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel have accelerated a trilateral alliance that spans diplomacy, defense, and energy.

Top leaders are convening more frequently – for instance, on December 22, 2025 the Greek and Israeli prime ministers will meet in Jerusalem alongside Cyprus’s president for a high-level summit.

This growing partnership, which has been steadily nurtured by successive governments, is backed by numerous agreements (nearly $4 billion worth) in the works or already signed.

While rooted in pragmatic interests like security cooperation and economic development, the alliance is also viewed by many as a response to regional tensions – and even, by some Orthodox Christians, as a development foreshadowed by prophecy.

This new alliance is underpinned by economic and political cooperation. A cornerstone is joint energy development: Greece, Cyprus and Israel are working to integrate their energy grids and offshore resources.

In mid-2025, Israel and Cyprus agreed to sign a deal to lay a subsea electrical cable linking their power grids – part of the broader India-Middle East-Europe Corridor – and to finalize the division of the Aphrodite gas field they share.

The electricity interconnector, often called the Great Sea Interconnector, will be the world’s longest underwater power cable once built, boosting regional energy security and linking Asia to Europe via Cyprus.

Plans for the ambitious EastMed gas pipeline – ~1,900 km long – to carry Israeli and Cypriot natural gas to Europe via Greece are also still on the table.

These projects have expected timelines stretching over several years (the Aphrodite gas agreement, for example, was slated to be signed by mid-2025), underscoring the long-term economic integration envisioned.

Politically, the three countries have institutionalized their partnership through regular summits and 3+1 dialogues.

Since 2016, Greece, Cyprus and Israel have held frequent trilateral meetings, often with U.S. support, to coordinate on regional policy.

Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides highlighted the need to “do much more in the areas of security, intelligence, tourism and trade,” noting pointedly that “there is always one neighbor trying to cause problems in our region”.

(Though he did not name it, that “one neighbor” was widely understood to be Turkey.) All three nations are close U.S. partners and democracies, which adds a layer of strategic alignment.

Observers note that Athens’ deepening cooperation with Israel – a policy shared by ideologically diverse Greek governments – has transformed Greece into a key regional strategic asset from Washington’s perspective.

In turn, Cyprus is leveraging its upcoming EU Council presidency in 2026 to champion Eastern Mediterranean interests in Brussels.

Defense ties among Greece, Cyprus, and Israel have intensified markedly. The three already conduct regular joint military exercises – for example, the annual Noble Dina naval drills (often joined by France or the US) practice anti-submarine warfare, search-and-rescue, and ship combat scenarios.

Rear Admiral Eyal Harel of Israel noted these drills are “of paramount importance in strengthening the navy’s connection with foreign fleets who share common interests”.

In November 2023, their defense ministers met and agreed to expand military cooperation.

Major arms deals back this up: Greece has signed record defense contracts with Israel, including a $1.65 billion agreement to establish a flight training center for Hellenic pilots by an Israeli firm.

Cyprus, for its part, has begun acquiring advanced Israeli weaponry such as the Barak MX air-defense system to replace aging Russian-made equipment.

(The island had long relied on Russian arms, but EU sanctions on Moscow after 2022 forced Nicosia to seek new suppliers.)

The most eye-catching recent development is a proposal to form a joint rapid-response military force combining troops from all three countries.

In mid-December, media reports in Athens and Jerusalem suggested that senior commanders are mulling a 2,500-strong brigade drawn from Greece, Israel, and Cyprus.

According to details leaked to the press, this Joint Rapid Reaction Force would involve ground, air and naval units operating seamlessly across the Eastern Mediterranean. Key features under discussion include:

Officials emphasize that such plans are still in discussion. In fact, Cypriot Defense Minister Vasilis Palmas swiftly denied that any formal agreement had been reached, saying “no such meeting with such an agenda has taken place” and “I do not confirm it”.

Palmas did, however, affirm that the three nations are indeed “allied countries” who constantly train together in bilateral and trilateral exercises – “this is how allied or friendly countries operate with each other,” he noted.

In other words, even without a standing joint force, the militaries of Greece, Cyprus, and Israel are increasingly interoperable.

The topic of a unified rapid-response unit is expected to be discussed further at the Jerusalem summit, alongside plans for energy security and offshore asset protection.

If eventually realized, the joint force would likely take shape over the next couple of years as logistics and command structures are ironed out.

Many analysts view the Greece-Cyprus-Israel alignment as a direct response to Turkey’s assertive regional posture.

Turkey (which neighbors both Greece and Cyprus and until recently had strained ties with Israel) looms large in any Eastern Mediterranean calculus.

Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ankara has pursued a “Blue Homeland” doctrine, asserting expansive claims over seas and resources that overlap with Greek and Cypriot exclusive economic zones.

In recent years, Turkey has unilaterally sent drill ships into Cyprus’s offshore gas fields and naval survey vessels into disputed Greek waters, igniting confrontations.

It also struck a controversial maritime deal with Libya in 2019, claiming waters off Crete, which Athens and its partners vehemently rejected.

These actions, alongside Turkey’s military adventurism in Syria and support for proxy forces in Libya, have cemented its image as a destabilizing force in the eyes of its southern neighbors.

As one policy observer put it, “Turkey, under President Erdoğan, has emerged as a disruptor, supporting extremist groups from Syria to Libya, threatening maritime boundaries, [and] manipulating migration flows”.

For Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, this alliance provides collective security in the face of Turkish pressure.

Deterring Turkey is openly on the agenda – the three leaders’ upcoming summit will focus on joint efforts to safeguard offshore energy installations and “counter Turkey’s efforts to consolidate its presence and influence” in the region.

Israeli and Greek air force chiefs met recently in Nicosia in an “unusual” high-level session to bolster cooperation in Eastern Mediterranean airspace, directly countering Turkey’s growing air and drone reach.

An Israeli security analyst, Shai Gal, pointed out that the alliance’s critical infrastructure lies in a maritime zone contested by Turkey’s claims – making coordination vital to prevent incidents.

He drew parallels to the Nord Stream pipeline sabotage in the Baltic, warning that the partners must secure undersea energy links (like the planned power cable) “with the utmost urgency,” rather than waiting for a similar “strategic shock”.

Turkey, for its part, has taken notice – and exception. Turkish officials accuse the Greece-Cyprus-Israel entente of trying to “disrupt the balance” in the region.

When Cypriot media reported new Israeli air-defense batteries arriving on the island, Ankara warned such armament could have “dangerous consequences” and vowed to “take all necessary measures” to safeguard the Turkish-occupied north of Cyprus.

Turkey’s defense ministry cautioned it is “closely monitoring” these efforts, implicitly reminding that it retains a sizable military force in northern Cyprus since seizing that territory in 1974.

The friction extends beyond Cyprus: Erdogan’s government, which harshly criticized Israel during the recent Gaza war, sees Jerusalem’s coziness with Athens and Nicosia as part of an encirclement strategy.

Indeed, cooperation among countries that increasingly view Turkey as a rival has become the new normal in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Even some Western commentators argue that formalizing this trilateral alliance (with U.S. support) would “establish clear consequences for destabilizing actions” by Turkey and perhaps eventually coax Ankara back into a cooperative framework – if it abandons its neo-Ottoman ambitions.

For now, the message from Athens, Nicosia, and Jerusalem is one of vigilance and unity: as Cyprus’s Archbishop Georgios bluntly put it, “Turkey’s objectives are the same both in Greek territory and in Cyprus, [so] we must present a united front against [its] insatiable appetite.”

Al Jazeera. (2023, November 30). Israel, Greece, Cyprus complete joint naval drills in Mediterranean. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/30/israel-greece-cyprus-complete-joint-naval-drills-in-mediterranean

Greek City Times. (2023, December 11). Greek, Israeli, Cypriot militaries plan joint 2,500-strong military force. https://greekcitytimes.com/2023/12/11/greek-israeli-cypriot-militaries-force/

Greek Reporter. (2023, December 12). Greece, Israel, Cyprus to hold trilateral meeting in Jerusalem. https://greekreporter.com/2023/12/12/greece-israel-cyprus-trilateral-meeting/

Jerusalem Post. (2023, December 14). Greece and Israel discuss growing defense cooperation ahead of summit. https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-775510

Middle East Forum. (2023, November 22). Greece, Cyprus, and Israel's strategic triangle could reshape the Eastern Mediterranean. https://www.meforum.org/64952/strategic-triangle-greece-cyprus-israel

Reuters. (2023, November 21). Cyprus-Israel power cable, gas field deal to be finalized by mid-2025. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/cyprus-israel-power-cable-gas-deal-2025-2023-11-21/

Reuters. (2023, December 6). Cyprus to acquire Israeli Barak MX air-defense system amid tensions with Turkey. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/cyprus-israel-barak-air-defence-deal-2023-12-06/

Times of Israel Staff. (2023, December 13). Greece, Cyprus, Israel mull joint force as Turkey tensions simmer. https://www.timesofisrael.com/greece-cyprus-israel-mull-joint-force-as-turkey-tensions-simmer/