The last days have seen a sharp uptick in geopolitical signalling across the Eastern Mediterranean and Europe. Ankara has doubled down on its claims in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, Israeli military leadership is openly preparing for a “surprise war”, Turkish commentators are assigning Greece and Cyprus roles in a wider conflict scenario, and NATO’s new Secretary General is warning that Europe must prepare for war with Russia on a scale not seen since the world wars.

On 10 December 2025, Greece’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a firm public response to remarks made by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan during the debate on the 2026 budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

In that speech, Fidan presented Ankara as wishing to maintain and develop what he called a “positive agenda” with Greece.

At the same time, he underlined that Turkey’s national positions in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean remain unwavering, and he repeated that Turkey supports what it calls a “just sharing” of energy and maritime resources in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Maritime zones and overlapping EEZ claims in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, illustrating how Greek, Turkish, Cypriot, Libyan and Egyptian interests collide.

Crucially, Fidan stated that Ankara wishes to examine all disputes in the Aegean “as a whole,” not only the continental shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

In Turkish diplomatic language this means that, in any eventual dialogue, Turkey wants to discuss not only the delimitation of maritime zones, but also the demilitarisation status of certain Greek islands, questions of sovereignty over some islands and islets, and issues connected with airspace, the Flight Information Region (FIR), and search-and-rescue responsibilities.

Greece, in its official reaction, described these positions as revisionist. The Greek Foreign Ministry reiterated once again that, in Athens’ view, the only dispute that can exist between Greece and Turkey is the delimitation of the EEZ and the continental shelf, and that all other issues raised by Ankara are not open for negotiation.

The Turkish minister also raised two particularly sensitive topics. The first concerns the Muslim population of Western Thrace.

Fidan referred to this community as a “Turkish minority” and framed the question in terms of reciprocity with the Greek Orthodox minority of Istanbul (Constantinople).

Greece responded by recalling that, under the Treaty of Lausanne, the minority in Western Thrace is defined on a religious basis as a Muslim minority, not on an ethnic basis, and that its members enjoy full civil and political rights within the Greek legal order.

The second topic concerns Cyprus and the wider Eastern Mediterranean. Fidan restated Turkey’s support for the self-declared “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC) and called for an end to what Ankara describes as the embargoes and isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriot entity.

He linked the Cyprus question with the idea of “fair sharing” of resources and maritime zones in the Eastern Mediterranean, which for Turkey includes a strong role for Turkish Cypriots in any energy or EEZ arrangements.

Despite the sharper tone and the reassertion of long-standing claims, Greek officials still publicly support convening the Greece–Turkey High-Level Cooperation Council in early 2026.

The focus of that forum is expected to be technical cooperation in areas such as migration management and civil protection, while exploratory contacts on maritime delimitation remain frozen since late 2024.

Investing isn’t about chasing headlines — it’s about clarity. In a world of hype and hot takes, The Daily Upside delivers real value: sharp, trustworthy insights on markets, business, and the economy, written by former bankers and seasoned financial journalists.

That’s why over 1 million investors — from Wall Street pros to Main Street portfolio managers — start their day with The Daily Upside.

Invest better. Read The Daily Upside.

Subscribe free today.

Alongside these developments in the Aegean, events further east have added another layer of tension.

On 7 December 2025, during a visit to northern Gaza, the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces, Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir, addressed Israeli soldiers near the so-called “yellow line” that marks the current ceasefire boundary.

He described this line as a new de facto front for the IDF and stated that the army is preparing for the scenario of a “surprise war,” calling this one of the cornerstones of the IDF’s upcoming multi-year plan. He stressed that the military must maintain readiness in all arenas and avoid any sense of complacency.

These remarks were widely reported in Israeli and international outlets and are generally interpreted as signalling that Israel now openly plans for the possibility of a sudden, large-scale, multi-front conflict, rather than only limited operations in Gaza or along individual borders.

In Turkey, Zamir’s reference to a “surprise war” quickly became the starting point for a prominent column by İbrahim Karagül, a well-known pro-government commentator in the daily Yeni Şafak.

In his article, entitled “What is Israel’s ‘surprise war’? Is that statement directed at Türkiye?”, published on 8 December 2025, Karagül argues that Israel is pursuing a strategy aimed at fragmenting Syria.

He claims that this is being done through various local actors, including parts of the Kurdish YPG and certain Druze groups, and that a conflict triggered through these forces could draw Turkey and Israel into direct confrontation, with the United States and European states drawn in as well.

Karagül then extends this analysis to the Eastern Mediterranean. In continuity with themes he has used in earlier pieces, he suggests that Greece and the Republic of Cyprus would, in such a crisis, assume roles analogous to those played by the YPG on land.

In previous columns he has used formulations such as “Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration have become Israel’s YPGs in the Eastern Mediterranean,” even going so far as to say that Israel has effectively assigned a “terrorist organisation role” to Greece and the Greek Cypriot side within its regional design.

These statements are opinion journalism rather than official Turkish policy, but they matter because they shape a segment of Turkish public discourse.

For observers in Greece and Cyprus, they underline that, even when Athens and Nicosia frame their energy cooperation and security partnerships with Israel and other states as defensive and legal, there are influential voices in Turkey presenting those same moves as elements of a broader anti-Turkish encirclement.

While these Mediterranean and Middle Eastern developments unfold, Europe’s broader security conversation has also shifted into a more alarming register.

On 11 December 2025, the new NATO Secretary General, Mark Rutte, delivered a keynote speech in Berlin that has been widely described as one of the starkest warnings yet from the Alliance’s leadership.

In this address, Rutte stated that, in NATO’s assessment, the Alliance is effectively “Russia’s next target.”

He warned that Russia could, within approximately five years, possess the capability and readiness to use military force directly against NATO member states, given the scale of Moscow’s mobilisation and war-focused economy.

He argued that conflict in Europe could reach a scale comparable to that experienced by the grandparents and great-grandparents of today’s Europeans, explicitly invoking the memory of the world wars.

Rutte criticised what he described as complacency among some allied governments, saying that too many do not feel the urgency of the situation.

He insisted that the time for action is now and called for a rapid increase in defence spending and industrial capacity across Europe in order to deter Russia and prevent the worst-case scenarios from becoming reality.

This Berlin speech situates the Russian threat as something that, in NATO’s view, extends well beyond the current war in Ukraine.

It suggests that European societies should begin not only to finance, but also to mentally prepare for the possibility that high-intensity warfare may no longer be confined to Ukrainian territory, even though NATO’s policy remains one of deterrence and defence rather than seeking direct conflict.

In a landscape flooded with hype and surface-level reporting, The Daily Upside delivers what business leaders actually need: clear, concise, and actionable intelligence on markets, strategy, and business innovation.

Founded by former bankers and veteran business journalists, it's built for decision-makers — not spectators. From macroeconomic shifts to sector-specific trends, The Daily Upside helps executives stay ahead of what’s shaping their industries.

That’s why over 1 million readers, including C-suite executives and senior decision-makers, start their day with it.

No noise. No jargon. Just business insight that drives results.

Subscribe free today.